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Abstract 
 
A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of how to 
distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to 
standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature, we introduce the firm as 
an explicit player and define a new class of transferable utility games called liability games. 
Liability games are superadditive, constant sum, partially convex, and partially concave.  
The core of a liability game is empty if and only if the firm is insolvent and has multiple 
positive liabilities.  
We analyze the nucleolus of the game and show that allocating the asset value of the firm 
using the nucleolus satisfies efficiency, non-negativity, and liabilities boundedness. We prove 
that at the nucleolus, the firm gets a strictly higher amount than its stand-alone value if and 
only if the firm is insolvent and has multiple positive liabilities. The firm is using the threat to 
pay others to get debt forgiveness and is able to keep a positive amount of its assets.  
We provide conditions under which the nucleolus coincides with a generalized truncated 
proportional rule, assigning a non-negative payment to the firm and distributing the 
remainder in proportion to the liabilities, truncated by the asset value of the firm. 
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Tartozásos játékok 
 
Csóka Péter - P. Jean-Jacques Herings 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
Egy vállalat tartozik a hitelezők egy csoportjának. Tanulmányunkban azt a kérdést vizsgáljuk, 
hogy hogyan osszuk el a vállalat eszközeit a hitelezők és a vállalat között. A játékelméleti 
irodalomban gyakran elemzett csődjátékokhoz képest a vállalatot explicit módon, játékosként 
kezeljük és egy új átruházható hasznosságú játékosztályt definiálunk, a tartozásos játékokat. 
A tartozásos játékok szuperadditívak, konstans összegűek, részben konvexek és részben 
konkávok. A tartozásos játékok magja pontosan akkor üres, ha a vállalat inszolvens és több 
pozitív tartozása van. 
A játék nukleoluszát elemezve belátjuk, hogy a nukleolusz szerint elosztva a vállalat eszközeit 
olyan elosztást kapunk, amely teljesíti a hatékonyság, a nemnegatívitás és a tartozások mint 
felső korlát tulajdonságokat. Belátjuk, hogy a nukleoluszban a vállalat pontosan akkor kap 
többet, mint amennyit önállóan is elérhetne, ha inszolvens és több pozitív tartozása van.  
A vállalat ekkor azzal fenyeget, hogy másoknak fizet, így elengednek a tartozásából és 
megtarthat egy pozitív részt az eszközeiből. Mutatunk olyan feltételeket, amikor a nukleolusz 
egybeesik egy általánosított csonkított arányos csődszabállyal, amikor a vállalat nemnegatív 
kifizetést kap és a maradék eszközét az összes eszközzel csonkolt tartozásokkal arányosan 
osztjuk el. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: csőd, tartozás elengedés, csődjátékok, nukleolusz, arányos csődszabály 
 
 
JEL kódok: C71, G10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liability Games∗
Pe´ter Cso´ka† P. Jean-Jacques Herings‡
November 29, 2017
Abstract
A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of
how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself.
Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature,
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1 Introduction
It is often the case that insolvent agents agree with their creditors to decrease the value
of their liabilities by reducing the principal, restructuring the payments, or getting longer
maturities. For each creditor, the difference between the value of the old liability and the
legally binding, but lower level of new liability is called the debt forgiveness of the creditor.
For sovereign defaults, about 30-40 % debt forgiveness is documented by Arslanalp and
Henry (2005), D’Erasmo (2008), and Benjamin and Wright (2009).
Insolvent agents can be either countries, states, firms, individuals, or other organiza-
tions. Throughout the paper, we will stick to the term firm. A liability problem consists of
a firm with a certain asset value and liabilities towards a group of creditors. The question
is how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself.
Given a liability problem, a liability rule assigns a vector of payments to the creditors and
to the firm. Payment vectors should satisfy non-negativity as the firm has limited liability
and no creditor should be asked to pay, liabilities boundedness as the firm does not pay
in excess of its liabilities, and efficiency meaning that the sum of the payments should be
equal to the firm’s asset value. A frequently studied liability rule is the proportional rule,
which assigns a payment of zero to the firm and distributes the asset value in proportion to
the liabilities to the firm’s creditors. We introduce generalized proportional rules as those
which allows for a non-negative payment to the firm and a proportional distribution of the
remainder.
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) note that
there is no settled theory for the renegotiations concerning the distribution of the asset
value of the firm, but creditors may join ad hoc committees and try to force the firm to
pay them first. We make use of the theory of transferable utility games and can thereby
omit the details of the renegotiation process. The resulting transferable utility games are
called liability games.
Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theoretical literature,
see O’Neill (1982) for a seminal contribution and Thomson (2003), Thomson (2013), and
Thomson (2015) for recent surveys, we introduce the firm as an explicit player. The worth
of a coalition in a liability game has the usual interpretation. It is what the members of a
coalition can guarantee for themselves, irrespective of what outsiders do. More specifically,
given a coalition and its complement, the firm first makes payments to the coalition it
belongs to, up to the value of the liabilities in the firm’s coalition, and then pays to the
complementary coalition. If the firm is solvent, its coalition can also keep what is left from
the asset value after paying all creditors.
Liability games turn out to have some special properties. They feature both concavity
and convexity: the subgame restricted to all creditors is convex, whereas the game obtained
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by restricting attention to the coalitions containing the firm is concave. Liability games
are superadditive: there is no loss of merging disjoint coalitions. Moreover, in a liability
game, the worth of a coalition plus the worth of the complementary coalition is always
equal to the asset value, that is, a liability game is a constant sum game (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944).
The core of a liability game consists of those payment vectors where no coalition of the
players can complain, that is, where every coalition of players receives at least its worth.
We show that the core of a liability game is non-empty if and only if the game is additive,
that is, the worth of a coalition is simply the sum of the worths of its members, so there is
no synergy from forming a coalition. We also show that a liability game is additive if and
only if the firm is solvent or it is insolvent and has only one positive liability.
Since the core of a liability game is empty when the firm is insolvent and has multiple
positive liabilities, a solution concept minimizing the complaints of the coalitions is a
natural candidate for a liability rule, which brings us to the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
We show that the nucleolus satisfies the properties required for a liability rule: efficiency,
non-negativity, and liabilities boundedness, that is, the payment to a creditor can be at
most as much as his claim. We show that the nucleolus coincides with the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953) for the case where the firm is solvent, or insolvent with at most two positive
liabilities.
We also prove that at the nucleolus, the firm gets a strictly higher amount than its
stand-alone value if and only if the firm is insolvent and has multiple positive liabilities.
Thus the firm needs the threat to pay others to end up with a positive asset value and
obtain some debt forgiveness. To provide an upper bound on how much an insolvent firm
with multiple positive liabilities can gain at the nucleolus as a liability rule, we show that
it ends up with at most half of the asset value. We show that in this case, creditors with
higher claims get higher payments, but they also have higher debt forgiveness. In fact,
there is a threshold of liabilities, below which there is no debt forgiveness, above which
there is positive debt forgiveness. Thus creditors with smaller claims may not be threat-
ened. Finally, we provide conditions under which the nucleolus coincides with a generalized
truncated proportional rule. This generalized truncated proportional rule assigns a non-
negative payment to the firm and distributes the remainder in proportion to the liabilities
that result after truncation by the asset value of the firm. We present a closed-form ex-
pression for the non-negative payment to the firm, thereby pinning down the generalized
truncated proportional rule that coincides with the nucleolus.
There is a large game-theoretic literature on problems where the bankrupt agent is not
treated as a player, but as an exogenously given estate. We refer to such problems as
bankruptcy problems and to the induced transferable utility games as bankruptcy games.
2
In bankruptcy problems, it is standard to allocate the entire estate to the claimants. For
surveys of this literature, we refer the reader to Thomson (2003), Thomson (2013), and
Thomson (2015).
Aumann and Maschler (1985) shows that in bankruptcy games the nucleolus coincides
with the Talmud rule. Depending on whether the sum of the half-claims is above or below
the value of the estate, the allocation rule is constrained equal awards or constrained equal
losses. Treating the bankrupt agent as a player, therefore, makes much difference. Not
only may the bankrupt agent get a positive amount, also the division of the remainder is
no longer guided by the application of the constrained equal awards and the constrained
equal losses rules, but rather by a truncated proportional rule.
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) considers a dynamic model with uncertainty in which
creditors have the costly option of taking the firm to the bankruptcy court or agree to some
debt forgiveness. Yue (2010) models both sovereign default and debt renegotiation in a
dynamic equilibrium model, where default may result in the loss of future access to capital
markets. What we show is that even without bankruptcy or reputation costs there is a
possibility for debt forgiveness, which is obtained by using the threat of paying others. Our
argument for debt forgiveness is also complementary to the argument that debt forgiveness
would increase the incentive of a debtor to make adjustment efforts to increase the value
of the assets (Corden, 1988), to some extent also benefiting the creditors. Our findings
can also be seen as a new motive to bail out an organization in a soft budget constraint
syndrome (Kornai, 1979).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define and illustrate
liability problems and liability games. In Section 3 we analyze the following properties
of liability games: additivity, convexity, concavity, superadditivity, and the constant-sum
property. In Section 4 we define liability rules and argue in favor of the nucleolus as
a liability rule. Section 5 we derive some properties of the payment vectors that result
from using the nucleolus. In Section 6 we present conditions under which the nucleolus
coincides with a particular generalized truncated proportional rule. Section 7 contains the
conclusion.
2 Liability Problems and Liability Games
Let N = {0, 1, . . . , c} denote the set of agents, where agent 0 is a firm having a set of
creditors C = {1, . . . , c} with cardinality |C| = c ≥ 1. The firm has asset value A ∈ R+
and liabilities ` ∈ RC+, with `i ∈ R+ the liability to creditor i ∈ C. The question is how to
distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself.
Definition 2.1. A liability problem is a pair (A, `) ∈ R+ × RC+.
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Let L be the class of liability problems.
Given a liability problem (A, `) ∈ L, a payment vector is a vector x ∈ R+×RC+ satisfying
liabilities boundedness and efficiency. Liabilities boundedness means that no creditor i ∈ C
receives more than his claim, so xi ≤ `i. Efficiency requires that the sum of the payments
should be equal to the asset value:
∑
i∈N xi = A. Note that non-negativity and efficiency
imply that payments to the firm are also bounded from above, x0 ≤ A.
Let ˆ`denote the vector of liabilities truncated by the asset value, that is ˆ`i = min{A, `i}
is the truncated liability of creditor i ∈ C. Given a subset of creditors S ⊆ C, we will use
the notation `(S) =
∑
i∈S `i for the total liabilities of S and ˆ`(S) =
∑
i∈S ˆ`i for the total
truncated liabilities of S. If `(C) > A, then the asset value is insufficient to honor all the
creditors and the firm is said to be insolvent. On the other hand, if `(C) ≤ A, then the
firm is solvent. Some of our results depend on whether ˆ`(C) is less than or equal to A or
not. The condition ˆ`(C) ≤ A is equivalent to either `(C) ≤ A or there is i ∈ C such that
`i > A and `j = 0 for every j ∈ C \ {i}. Thus ˆ`(C) ≤ A means that the firm is solvent or
it is insolvent with only one positive liability.
The agents can form coalitions in bargaining over the eventual payment vector. A
coalition is an element of 2N , the collection of all subsets of N. The worth of a non-empty
coalition S ∈ 2N is equal to what members of S can guarantee for themselves, irrespective
of what outsiders do. It matters greatly whether the firm, player 0, is a member of S or
not. If 0 ∈ S, then the firm pays its liabilities to its creditors within the coalition, up to
the asset value. Moreover, the coalition can also keep what is left from the asset value after
paying all other creditors which is a positive amount if and only if the firm is solvent. If
0 6∈ S, then coalition S can only obtain what is left after the firm has paid its liabilities to
creditors not in S in full and at most an amount equal to the value of the liabilities of its
members.
A liability problem therefore gives rise to a transferable utility game, which is formally
a function v from the set of all coalitions 2N to the real numbers with v(∅) = 0. The set
of all transferable utility games with player set N is denoted by G. The next definition
formally defines the coalitional worths for the liability game v that results from a liability
problem (`, A) ∈ L.
Definition 2.2. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem. The induced liability game v : 2N → R
is defined by setting, for S ∈ 2N ,
v(S) =
{
min{A, `(S \ {0})}+ max{A− `(C), 0}, if 0 ∈ S,
min{`(S),max{0, A− `(C \ S)}}, if 0 6∈ S.
Notice that v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ 2N and v(N) = A. The formulas in Definition 2.2
simplify by specifying them separately for the case where the firm is solvent and the case
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where the firm is insolvent. This is demonstrated in the following theorem, the proof of
which is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Theorem 2.3. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem. If the firm is solvent, so `(C) ≤ A,
then the induced liability game v : 2N → R satisfies, for S ∈ 2N ,
v(S) =
{
A− `(C \ S), if 0 ∈ S,
`(S), if 0 6∈ S.
If the firm is insolvent, so `(C) > A, then the induced liability game v : 2N → R satisfies,
for S ∈ 2N ,
v(S) =
{
min{A, `(S \ {0})}, if 0 ∈ S,
max{0, A− `(C \ S)}, if 0 6∈ S.
To obtain the worth v(S) for the solvent case when 0 ∈ S, observe that in that case
`(S \ {0}) +A− `(C) = A− `(C \S). Similarly, to obtain the worth v(S) for the insolvent
case when 0 6∈ S, notice that A− `(C \ S) < `(S).
For a game v ∈ G and a non-empty coalition D ∈ 2N , the subgame vD with player set D
is obtained by restricting v to subsets of D. If the game v is induced by a liability problem
with an insolvent firm, then for the set of creditors C the subgame vC corresponds to
the transferable utility game defined by O’Neill (1982) for standard bankruptcy problems.
However, here we also treat the firm as a player. Moreover, we do not restrict attention to
the insolvent case. As an illustration of liability games, consider the following examples.
Example 2.4. Consider the liability problem with two creditors, so N = {0, 1, 2}, A = 12,
and ` = (6, 9). The firm in this liability problem is insolvent. The induced liability game v
is illustrated in Table 1:
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(S) 0 3 6 6 9 12 12
Table 1: The induced liability game when N = {0, 1, 2}, A = 12, `1 = 6, and `2 = 9.
The worth of coalition {1} is equal to 3, since 3 is the amount that remains for creditor 1
after the firm has paid creditor 2 in full, and corresponds to the amount that creditor 1
can get without the cooperation of the firm. The worth of coalition {0, 1} is 6. If the firm
cooperates with creditor 1, then together they can achieve 6 by having the firm pay its
liability to creditor 1 in full.
In this example, it is easily seen that there is no payment vector x against which no
coalition has a complaint. Let x be a payment vector with x0 = 0. Then v({0, 1}) = 6
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and v({0, 2}) = 9 implies that x1 + x2 ≥ 15 in order for coalitions {0, 1} and {0, 2} not
to object. Since there are at most 12 units to allocate, this is impossible. Let x be a
payment vector with x0 > 0. Then v({1, 2}) = 12 implies x0 + x1 + x2 > 12, leading to a
contradiction. The core of the game is empty, and we will see in Section 4 that this is a
quite general phenomenon.
The next example illustrates the consequences of raising the asset value in Example 2.4
to 20.
Example 2.5. Consider the liability problem with two creditors, so N = {0, 1, 2}, A = 20,
and ` = (6, 9). Notice that the firm is solvent. The induced liability game v is illustrated
in Table 2. There is exactly one payment vector that does not give rise to objections by
S ∅ {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(S) 0 5 6 9 11 14 15 20
Table 2: The induced liability game when N = {0, 1, 2}, A = 20, `1 = 6, and `2 = 9.
any coalition: x = (5, 6, 9). This payment vector is the one that results when the firm pays
its two creditors in full and keeps the remainder.
3 Properties of Liability Games
In this section, we examine the following properties of liability games.
Definition 3.1. A game v ∈ G is:
• Additive if for all S ∈ 2N we have v(S) = ∑i∈S v({i}).
• Constant sum (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) if for all S ∈ 2N we have
v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N).
• Convex (Shapley, 1971) if for all S, T ∈ 2N we have v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ).
• Concave if for all S, T ∈ 2N we have v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
• Superadditive if for all S, T ∈ 2N such that S∩T = ∅ we have v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T ).
• Zero-monotonic if for all i ∈ N , for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have v(S)+v({i}) ≤ v(S∪{i}).
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Note that additivity implies the constant sum property and convexity, convexity im-
plies superadditivity, and superadditivity implies zero-monotonicity, but not the other way
around.
First, we show that a liability game is additive if and only if the firm is solvent or it is
insolvent with only one positive liability.
Theorem 3.2. Given a liability problem (A, `) ∈ L, the induced liability game v is additive
if and only if ˆ`(C) ≤ A. The stand-alone values of an additive liability game are given by
v({0}) = A− ˆ`(C) and, for every i ∈ C, v({i}) = ˆ`i.
Proof.
(⇐)
The condition ˆ`(C) ≤ A is equivalent to either `(C) ≤ A or there is a single creditor
i ∈ C such that `i > A and `j = 0 for all j ∈ C \ {i}. It holds by Theorem 2.3 that in the
former case
v(S) =
{
A− `(C \ S), 0 ∈ S,
`(S), 0 /∈ S,
and in the latter case
v(S) =

min{A, `(S \ {0})} = ˆ`(S \ {0}) = ˆ`i, 0, i ∈ S,
min{A, `(S \ {0})} = 0, 0 ∈ S, i ∈ N \ S,
max{0, A− `(C \ S)} = A− ˆ`(C \ S) = A− 0 = ˆ`i, 0 ∈ N \ S, i ∈ S,
max{0, A− `(C \ S)} = A− ˆ`(C \ S) = A− A = 0, 0, i ∈ N \ S.
It is now easily verified that in both cases, v({0}) = A − ˆ`(C), v({j}) = ˆ`j for all j ∈ C,
and v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊆ N , so v is additive.
(⇒)
Suppose ˆ`(C) > A. Let i ∈ C be such that `i > 0. By Theorem 2.3 it holds that
v({0}) = min{A, `(∅)} = 0,
v({i}) = max{0, A− `(C \ {i})} ≤ max{0, A− ˆ`(C \ {i})} < ˆ`i,
where the strict inequality follows from ˆ`i > 0 and ˆ`(C) > A. At the same time it holds by
Theorem 2.3 that
v({0, i}) = min{A, `i} = ˆ`i,
so v is not additive, yielding a contradiction. 2
It is easily verified in Examples 2.4 and 2.5 that for every coalition S ∈ 2N the sum of
the worths of coalition S and its complementary coalition N \ S is constant and equal to
the asset value A. We show next that this property holds in all generality.
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Theorem 3.3. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem. The induced liability game v is
constant sum.
Proof. If ˆ`(C) ≤ A, then v is additive by Theorem 3.2 and the result follows. We
therefore assume ˆ`(C) > A, which implies that `(C) > A. Let some S ∈ 2N be given. We
distinguish two cases: 1. 0 ∈ S and 2. S ⊆ C.
Case 1. 0 ∈ S.
By Theorem 2.3 it holds that
v(S) + v(N \ S) = min{A, `(S \ {0})}+ max{0, A− `(C \ (N \ S))}
= min{A, `(S \ {0})}+ max{0, A− `(S \ {0})}
= A,
where the last equality follows by considering the two cases `(S \{0}) ≤ A and `(S \{0}) >
A separately.
Case 2. S ⊆ C.
By Theorem 2.3 we have that
v(S) + v(N \ S) = max{0, A− `(C \ S)}+ min{A, `((N \ S) \ {0})}
= max{0, A− `(C \ S)}+ min{A, `(C \ S)}
= A,
where the last equality follows by considering the two cases `(C \S) ≤ A and `(C \S) > A
separately. 2
Since the worth of the grand coalition v(N) is equal to the asset value A, we know that
the sum of the worths of two complementary coalitions is actually equal to A.
Liability games feature both concavity and convexity. As we can also see in Exam-
ples 2.4 and 2.5, the subgame restricted to the set of creditors is convex. The game
restricted to coalitions containing the firm is concave. More precise, in the next result we
show that the game v+0 on the set of players C defined by
v+0(S) = v({0} ∪ S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ C
is concave.
Theorem 3.4. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
The subgame vC is convex and the game v+0 is concave.
Proof. The subgame vC corresponds to the transferable utility game defined by O’Neill
(1982) for standard bankruptcy problems, which is shown to be convex by Curiel, Maschler,
and Tijs (1987).
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Consider any S, T ∈ 2C \ {∅}. We have that
v+0(S) + v+0(T ) = v({0} ∪ S) + v({0} ∪ T )
= v(N)− v(N \ ({0} ∪ S)) + v(N)− v(N \ ({0} ∪ T ))
= v(N)− vC(C \ S) + v(N)− vC(C \ T )
≥ v(N)− vC((C \ S) ∪ (C \ T )) + v(N)− vC(C \ S) ∩ (C \ T ))
= v(N)− vC(C \ (S ∩ T )) + v(N)− vC(C \ (S ∪ T ))
= v({0} ∪ (S ∩ T )) + v({0} ∪ (S ∪ T ))
= v+0(S ∩ T ) + v+0(S ∪ T ),
where the second equality uses Theorem 3.3, the inequality follows from the convexity of
vC , and the penultimate equality uses Theorem 3.3 again. 2
The last property we consider in this section is superadditivity. The next result shows
that liability games satisfy this property.
Theorem 3.5. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem. The induced liability game v is
superadditive.
Proof. Let S, T ∈ 2N be two disjoint coalitions, so S ∩ T = ∅. If ˆ`(C) ≤ A, then the
game is additive by Theorem 3.2 and the result follows. We therefore assume ˆ`(C) > A.
If 0 /∈ S ∪ T, then v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) by the convexity of vC as demonstrated
in Theorem 3.4 and the result holds, so we only need to consider the situation where
0 ∈ S ∪ T. Without loss of generality, assume 0 ∈ S. By Theorem 2.3 it holds that
v(S) = min{A, `(S \ {0})},
v(T ) = max{0, A− `(C \ T )},
v(S ∪ T ) = min{A, `(S ∪ T \ {0})}.
We consider three cases: 1. A ≤ `(S \ {0}). 2. A > `(S \ {0}) and A ≤ `(C \ T ). 3.
A > `(S \ {0}) and A > `(C \ T ).
Case 1. A ≤ `(S \ {0}).
It holds that v(S) = v(S ∪ T ) = A. Since ˆ`(C) > A, we have that
`(C \ T ) ≥ ˆ`(C \ T ) ≥ ˆ`(S \ {0}) ≥ A,
so v(T ) = 0. It follows that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) as desired.
Case 2. A > `(S \ {0}) and A ≤ `(C \ T ).
Since `(C \ T ) ≥ A, it holds that v(T ) = 0, so
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) = v(S) + v(T ).
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Case 3. A > `(S \ {0}) and A > `(C \ T ). It holds that v(S) = `(S \ {0}). Since
`(C \ T ) < A, we have that
v(T ) = A− `(C \ T ) < `(T ),
where the strict inequality follows from ˆ`(C) > A. It also holds that
v(T ) = A− `(C \ T ) ≤ A− `(S \ {0}).
We find that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ min{`(S \ {0}) + A− `(S \ {0}), `(S \ {0}) + `(T )}
= min{A, `(S ∪ T \ {0})} = v(S ∪ T ).
2
Since the liability game v is superadditive, it is also zero-monotonic, a property that turns
out to be useful in the sequel.
4 The Nucleolus as a Liability Rule
A liability rule is a function that assigns a payment vector to each liability problem.
Definition 4.1. A liability rule is a function f : L → RN+ such that, for every (A, `) ∈ L,
for every i ∈ C, fi(A, `) ≤ `i and
∑
i∈N fi(A, `) = A.
A payment vector satisfies non-negativity, liabilities boundedness, and efficiency. A
natural way to proceed is to consider the liability game that is induced by the liability
problem and to use a liability rule that corresponds to a solution of the liability game.
It needs to be shown that the allocation prescribed by the solution is indeed a payment
vector.
Let a game v ∈ G be given. An allocation is a vector x ∈ RN such that xi is the payoff
of player i ∈ N . The allocation x yields a total payoff of x(S) = ∑i∈S xi to the members
of coalition S ∈ 2N . The allocation x is called efficient if x(N) = v(N) and coalitionally
rational if x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N . The allocation x is blocked by coalition S ∈ 2N if
x(S) < v(S).
The set of pre-imputations of a game v ∈ G is equal to I∗(v) = {x ∈ RN |x(N) =
v(N)}. The addition of individual rationality constraints leads to the set of imputations
I(v) = {x ∈ I∗(v)| for every i ∈ N, xi ≥ v({i})}. The core of the game v (Gillies,
1959), denoted by Core(v), is the set of efficient and coalitionally rational allocations,
Core(v) = {x ∈ I∗(v)| for every S ∈ 2N , x(S) ≥ v(S)}.
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We define N = 2N \{∅, N} as the collection of all non-empty coalitions that are proper
subsets of the grand coalition. The excess e(S, x) of coalition S ∈ N at an allocation
x ∈ RN is given by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
The excess e(S, x) measures the complaint of coalition S against allocation x. The higher
the excess e(S, x), the less satisfied coalition S is with x. Let e(x) ∈ RN be the vector of
excesses at x, indexed by S ∈ N . A pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(v) belongs to Core(v) if and
only if for every S ∈ N we have that e(S, x) ≤ 0.
The next result is a corollary of Theorem 3.3.
Corollary 4.2. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
For every S ∈ N , for every pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(v), it holds that e(S, x)+e(N \S, x) = 0.
Since a liability game is constant sum, it follows that for any coalition and any pre-
imputation the sum of the excesses of the coalition and the complementary coalition is
equal to zero. It therefore holds that the core of a liability game is non-empty if and only
if all excesses are equal to zero, a very strong condition. Indeed, the following result shows
that the core of a liability game is empty if and only if ˆ`(C) > A.
Theorem 4.3. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
If ˆ`(C) ≤ A, then Core(v) = {(A− ˆ`(C), ˆ`)}. If ˆ`(C) > A, then Core(v) = ∅.
Proof. Let ˆ`(C) ≤ A. Then v is additive by Theorem 3.2. It follows that Core(v) is a
singleton, containing the unique imputation x ∈ I(v) where each player gets his stand-alone
value. By Theorem 3.2 it holds that x0 = A− ˆ`(C) and, for every i ∈ C, xi = ˆ`i.
Let ˆ`(C) > A. Suppose Core(v) 6= ∅ and let x ∈ Core(v). For every S ∈ N , it holds
that e(S, x) ≤ 0. By Corollary 4.2 it follows that, for every S ∈ N , e(S, x) = 0. The latter
property can only hold if v is additive. By Theorem 3.2, we have that ˆ`(C) ≤ A, leading
to a contradiction. 2
In case the firm is solvent, then there is a unique core element. At this core element,
the firm pays each of its liabilities in full and keeps the remaining asset value for itself. In
case the firm is insolvent and has a single positive liability, there is a unique core element
as well. At this core element, the firm pays the creditor with a positive claim an amount
equal to A and has a remaining asset value equal to 0.
In all other cases, the core is empty. There is always a coalition with a complaint irre-
spective of the pre-imputation chosen. A solution concept that minimizes the complaints
of the coalitions then appears as a natural candidate for a liability rule, since it leads to
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allocations as close to the core as possible. This leads us to advocate the nucleolus as
introduced in Schmeidler (1969), formally defined next.
The lexicographic order lex is the complete order on R|N | defined as follows. For
x, y ∈ RN it holds that x lex y if and only if either x = y or there exists a number
k′ ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} such that, for every k < k′, xk = yk, and xk′ < yk′ . We have that x ≺lex y
if and only if x lex y and x 6= y. The coordinate ordering mapping θ : RN 7→ R|N | is
defined such that it arranges the coordinates of a vector x ∈ RN in a weakly decreasing
order.
Definition 4.4. The nucleolus of a game v ∈ G is
Nu(v) = {x ∈ I(v)| for every y ∈ I(v), θ(e(x)) lex θ(e(y))}.
As shown in Schmeidler (1969), the definition of the nucleolus results in a uniquely
specified imputation, so the set Nu(v) is a singleton. From now on, we will therefore treat
Nu(v) as a vector rather than a set. It is the imputation that lexicographically minimizes
the ordered excesses. If the core of a game v ∈ G is non-empty, then Nu(v) ∈ Core(v).
If v is a liability game, then a non-empty core means that the core is a singleton. In this
case, either the firm is solvent and the nucleolus then requires the firm to pay its liabilities
in full or the firm is insolvent and has a single positive liability on which A is paid, see
Theorem 4.3.
If we replace the set of imputations I(v) by the set of pre-imputations I∗(v) in Defini-
tion 4.4, then we obtain the pre-nucleolus Nu∗(v) of the game.
Consider the payment vector x = (1, 4, 7) in Example 2.4, so with a strictly positive
payoff of 1 for the firm. The excesses at (1, 4, 7) for coalitions S ∈ N are easily verified to
be as follows.
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2}
e(S, (1, 4, 7)) -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
Table 3: The excesses at x = (1, 4, 7) in Example 2.4.
Note that indeed, as stated in Corollary 4.2, the sum of the excesses of a coalition and
its complementary coalition is equal to zero.
The sum of the excesses of the two-player coalitions is equal
v({0, 1}) + v({0, 2}) + v({1, 2})− 2x(N) = v({0, 1}) + v({0, 2}) + v({1, 2})− 2v(N)
= 27− 24 = 3.
The highest excess of any of the two-player coalitions is therefore at least equal to 1 and
any pre-imputation different from (1, 4, 7) will lead to some two-player coalition having
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an excess strictly above 1. It follows that the pre-nucleolus Nu∗(v) = (1, 4, 7). Since the
pre-nucleolus is an imputation, it coincides with the nucleolus.
The firm, even though it is insolvent, gets a strictly positive payment of 1 at the
nucleolus. It pays an amount of 4 to creditor 1, and an amount of 7 to creditor 2, and
therefore is allowed to keep 1 unit for itself from the the asset value of its asset value
A = 12 . Both creditor 1 and creditor 2 receive 2 units less than their claim on the firm.
We define next the debt forgiveness of a creditor as the difference between the liability
towards him and the payment he receives. The truncated debt forgiveness of a creditor
is defined as the difference between the truncated liability towards him and the received
payment.
Definition 4.5. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and x ∈ RN+ be a payment vector.
The debt forgiveness of creditor i ∈ C is given by di(A, `, x) = `i − xi. The truncated debt
forgiveness by creditor i ∈ C is given by dˆi(A, `, x) = ˆ`i − xi = min{A, `i} − xi.
In Example 2.4, both creditor 1 and creditor 2 have a debt forgiveness of 2 units at
the nucleolus. In Example 2.5, all creditors have a debt forgiveness, as well as a truncated
debt forgiveness, equal to 0.
The firm is said to receive strong debt forgiveness at a payment vector x ∈ RN+ if x0 > 0
and there is strictly positive debt forgiveness by at least one of the creditors. If the firm
is solvent, it receives strong debt forgiveness if and only if there is strictly positive debt
forgiveness by at least one of the creditors. If the firm is insolvent, then it receives strong
debt forgiveness if and only if it receives a strictly positive payment.
Another well-known solution for a game v ∈ G is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
denoted by φ(v). It is defined by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) |S|!(|N \ S| − 1)!|N |! , i ∈ N.
The next result derives the nucleolus for liability problems with ˆ`(C) ≤ A, thereby gener-
alizing Example 2.5.
Theorem 4.6. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem such that ˆ`(C) ≤ A and let v be
the induced liability game. It holds that Nu(v) = φ(v) = (A − ˆ`(C), ˆ`), for every i ∈ C,
dˆi(A, `,Nu(v)) = 0, and for every S ∈ N , e(S,Nu(v)) = 0.
Proof. Since v is additive by Theorem 3.2, it is well-known that the nucleolus coincides
with the Shapley value and is equal to the unique core element, as given in Theorem 4.3.
It is immediate that the truncated debt forgiveness is equal to 0 for every creditor and that
all excesses at the nucleolus are equal to zero. 2
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When ˆ`(C) ≤ A, then the liability game v is additive, so the nucleolus and the Shapley value
coincide. The firm pays every creditor an amount equal to the corresponding truncated
liability, so truncated debt forgiveness is equal to zero. In an additive game, all excesses
are equal to zero at the nucleolus.
The case ˆ`(C) ≤ A means that either the firm is solvent or the firm is insolvent and
has only one positive liability. The next result derives the nucleolus for liability problems
with an insolvent firm and two positive liabilities, thereby generalizing Example 2.4, and
shows it to coincide with the Shapley value.
Theorem 4.7. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem with two positive liabilities, say `1 and
`2, and `(C) > A. Let v be the induced liability game. It holds that Nu(v) = φ(v),
Nu0(v) =
2 ˆ`1+2 ˆ`2−2A
6
,
Nu1(v) =
4A+2 ˆ`1−4 ˆ`2
6
,
Nu2(v) =
4A+2 ˆ`2−4 ˆ`1
6
,
Nui(v) = 0, i ∈ C \ {1, 2}.
Both creditors with a positive liability have the same truncated debt forgiveness:
dˆ1(A, `, φ(v)) = dˆ2(A, `, φ(v)) =
−4A+ 4 ˆ`1 + 4 ˆ`2
6
.
Proof. We first consider the liability subgame v˜ = v{0,1,2}, so we omit the creditors
with claims equal to zero. By Theorem 2.3 it follows that v˜ is as presented in Table 4.
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v˜(S) 0 A− ˆ`2 A− ˆ`1 ˆ`1 ˆ`2 A A
Table 4: The induced liability game when N = {0, 1, 2} and ˆ`(C) > A.
The Shapley value is calculated in Table 5. It holds that
φ(v˜) =
(
2 ˆ`1+2 ˆ`2−2A
6
, 4A+2
ˆ`
1−4 ˆ`2
6
, 4A+2
ˆ`
2−4 ˆ`1
6
)
.
We define a1 = (2A− 2 ˆ`1 − 2 ˆ`2)/6 and a2 = (−2A+ 2 ˆ`1 + 2 ˆ`2)/6. It holds that a1 < 0
and a2 > 0. Table 6 presents the excesses at φ(v˜) for coalitions S ∈ N .
The sum of the excesses of the two-player coalitions is equal to
v˜({0, 1}) + v˜({0, 2}) + v˜({1, 2})− 2x(N) = v˜({0, 1}) + v˜({0, 2}) + v˜({1, 2})− 2v˜(N)
= ˆ`1 + ˆ`2 − A.
Decreasing any of the excesses of the two-player coalitions below a2 would result in an
excess above a2 at another two-player coalition. The pre-nucleolus of v˜ therefore coincides
with the Shapley value.
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permutation marginal contribution
0 1 2
0, 1, 2 0 ˆ`1 A− ˆ`1
0, 2, 1 0 A− ˆ`2 ˆ`2
1, 0, 2 ˆ`1 + ˆ`2 − A A− ˆ`2 A− ˆ`1
1, 2, 0 0 A− ˆ`2 ˆ`2
2, 0, 1 ˆ`1 + ˆ`2 − A A− ˆ`2 A− ˆ`1
2, 1, 0 0 ˆ`1 A− ˆ`1
φ(v˜) 2
ˆ`
1+2 ˆ`2−2A
6
4A+2 ˆ`1−4 ˆ`2
6
4A+2 ˆ`2−4 ˆ`1
6
Table 5: The Shapley value when N = {0, 1, 2} and `(C) > A.
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2}
e(S, φ(v˜)) a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2
Table 6: The excesses at the Shapley value when N = {0, 1, 2} and `(C) > A.
We argue next that the pre-nucleolus of v˜ belongs to the set of imputations I(v˜), so
coincides with the nucleolus of v˜. We have that
Nu0(v˜) =
2 ˆ`1+2 ˆ`2−2A
6
> 0 = v˜({0}),
Nu1(v˜) =
4A+2 ˆ`1−4 ˆ`2
6
> A− ˆ`2 = v˜({1}),
Nu2(v˜) =
4A+2 ˆ`2−4 ˆ`1
6
> A− ˆ`1 = v˜({2}),
where the strict inequalities follow from the fact that 2ˆ`1 + 2ˆ`2 > 2A.
Since the players in C \ {1, 2} are null players, they get a payoff equal to zero in both
the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The payoffs of the other players are the same as in
the game v˜.
We finally calculate the level of truncated debt forgiveness at the payment vector Nu(v).
It holds that
dˆ1(A, `,Nu(v)) = ˆ`1 − Nu1(v) = ˆ`1 − 4A+2 ˆ`1−4 ˆ`26 = −4A+4
ˆ`
1+4 ˆ`2
6
,
dˆ2(A, `,Nu(v)) = ˆ`2 − Nu2(v) = ˆ`2 − 4A+2 ˆ`2−4 ˆ`16 = −4A+4
ˆ`
1+4 ˆ`2
6
.
2
As demonstrated in Theorem 4.7, the nucleolus of a liability game with an insolvent
firm having two positive liabilities prescribes the same truncated debt forgiveness for both
creditors with a positive claim. The firm gets a payoff above its stand-alone value v({0}),
since Nu0(v) =
2 ˆ`1+2 ˆ`2−2A
6
> 0 = v({0}). The firm is therefore able to keep some of its
assets, even though it is insolvent.
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Since the liability game v is constant sum by Theorem 3.3, the worths of all two-player
coalitions are the same in the zero-normalized game. The coincidence of the nucleolus
and the Shapley value for the case with c = 2 then also follows from Yokote, Funaki, and
Kamijo (2014), who show that the two-player coalitions having the same worths in the
zero-normalized game is a sufficient condition for the coincidence of the nucleolus and the
Shapley value in games with three players.
It is easy to find examples showing that the coincidence of Theorem 4.7 does not
necessarily hold for liability problems with three or more positive liabilities.
The following result claims that the pre-nucleolus satisfies individual rationality, so the
pre-nucleolus coincides with the nucleolus.
Theorem 4.8. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
For every i ∈ N, it holds that Nu∗i (v) ≥ v({i}), so Nu(v) = Nu∗(v).
Proof. The game v is superadditive by Theorem 3.5 and therefore zero-monotonic. It
follows from Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1979) that, for every i ∈ N, Nu∗i (v) ≥ v({i}). 2
Since the pre-nucleolus coincides with the nucleolus, from now on we will restrict at-
tention to the nucleolus.
By Theorem 2.3 it follows immediately that, for every i ∈ N, v({i}) ≥ 0, and∑
i∈N
Nui(v) = v(N) = A.
This implies that, for every i ∈ N, Nui ≤ A. The next result shows that the nucleolus
also satisfies truncated liabilities boundedness, which implies liabilities boundedness. The
nucleolus therefore assigns a payment vector to each liability game.
Theorem 4.9. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
For every i ∈ C it holds that Nui(v) ≤ ˆ`i.
Proof. If ˆ`(C) ≤ A, then v is additive by Theorem 3.2, so for every i ∈ C it holds
that Nui(v) = v({i}) = ˆ`i. We therefore assume ˆ`(C) > A, which implies that `(C) > A
and hence the liability game is given by the second part of Theorem 2.3. Let x = Nu(v).
Since, for every i ∈ N, xi ≤ A, it remains to be shown that xi ≤ `i.
Suppose i ∈ C is such that xi > `i. We define y ∈ I(v) by
yi = `i,
yj = xj +
xi−`i
c
, j ∈ N \ {i}.
Note that y ∈ I(v) since yi = `i ≥ v({i}), for every j ∈ N \ {i}, yj > xj ≥ v({j}), and
y(N) = A. We show next that θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)), contradicting that x is equal to the
nucleolus.
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For every non-empty proper subset S of N \ {i}, consider the pair of excesses
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S),
e(S ∪ {i}, x) = v(S ∪ {i})− x(S)− xi.
Notice that e(S, x) > e(S ∪ {i}, x) since v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ `i and xi > `i. The pair of
excesses at y is given by
e(S, y) = v(S)− y(S) = v(S)− x(S)− |S|(xi−`i)
c
,
e(S ∪ {i}, y) = v(S ∪ {i})− y(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {i})− x(S)− |S|(xi−`i)
c
− `i.
We have that e(S, y) < e(S, x) and
e(S, y)− e(S ∪ {i}, y) = v(S)− v(S ∪ {i}) + `i ≥ 0.
Thus for all the pairs of coalitions that we considered so far, we have lexicographically
improved the ordered excesses when replacing the imputation x by the imputation y.
The final pair of coalitions to consider is {i} and N \ {i}. We have that
e({i}, x) = v({i})−xi = max{0, A− `(C \{i})}−xi < max{0, A− `(C \{i})}− `i < 0,
where the first inequality follows from xi > `i and the second inequality from `(C) > A. It
holds that e({i}, x) < e({i}, y) and
e({i}, y) = v({i})− yi = max{0, A− `(C \ {i})} − `i < 0.
By Corollary 4.2, we now get that e(N \ {i}, x) = −e({i}, x) > 0 and e(N \ {i}, x) >
e(N \ {i}, y) > 0. Thus also this pair of ordered excesses is lexicographically improved
when x is replaced by y.
We have partitioned N in pairs and have shown that the ordered excesses of each pair
are lexicographically improved when replacing x by y. It follows that e(y) ≺lex e(x), a con-
tradiction to x being the nucleolus. Consequently, it holds that, for every i ∈ C, xi ≤ `i. 2
It follows from Theorem 4.9 that we can use the nucleolus as a liability rule.
5 Properties of the Nucleolus
In this section, we derive properties of the payment vector generated by the nucleolus.
We start by analyzing the asset value that the firm is allowed to keep after making its
payments. To do so, we first study the vector of excesses in more detail.
Theorem 5.1. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem, let v be the induced liability game,
and let x = Nu(v). For every S ⊂ T ⊂ C, we have:
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1. If ˆ`(T ) ≤ A, then e({0} ∪ S, x) ≤ e({0} ∪ T, x).
2. If ˆ`(T ) ≤ A, then e(C \ S, x) ≥ e(C \ T, x).
3. If ˆ`(S) ≥ A, then e({0} ∪ S, x) ≥ e({0} ∪ T, x).
4. If ˆ`(S) ≥ A, then e(C \ S, x) ≤ e(C \ T, x).
Proof. In case ˆ`(C) ≤ A, all excesses are equal to zero by Theorem 4.6, so the result
follows. For the remainder of the proof, we assume ˆ`(C) > A.
1. By Theorem 2.3, we have that
e({0} ∪ S, x) = v({0} ∪ S)− x({0} ∪ S)
= min{A, `(S)} − x({0} ∪ S) = ˆ`(S)− x({0} ∪ S),
e({0} ∪ T, x) = v({0} ∪ T )− x({0} ∪ T )
= min{A, `(T )} − x({0} ∪ T ) = ˆ`(T )− x({0} ∪ T ),
where the last equalities in both equations rely on ˆ`(S) ≤ ˆ`(T ) ≤ A. It follows that
e({0} ∪ T, x)− e({0} ∪ S, x) = ˆ`(T \ S)− x(T \ S) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows since the nucleolus satisfies truncated liabilities bound-
edness by Theorem 4.9.
2. This part follows from part 1 and Corollary 4.2.
3. By Theorem 2.3, we have that
e({0} ∪ S, x) = v({0} ∪ S)− x({0} ∪ S)
= min{A, `(S)} − x({0} ∪ S) = A− x({0} ∪ S),
e({0} ∪ T, x) = v({0} ∪ T )− x({0} ∪ T )
= min{A, `(T )} − x({0} ∪ T ) = A− x({0} ∪ T ),
where the last equalities in both equations follow since A ≤ ˆ`(S) ≤ ˆ`(T ). We have
that
e({0} ∪ S, x)− e({0} ∪ T, x) = x(T \ S) ≥
∑
i∈T\S
v({i}) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from Theorem 4.8.
4. This part follows from Part 3 and Corollary 4.2.
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2For coalitions containing the firm and with claims totaling to less than the asset value, the
excesses at the nucleolus are weakly increasing as the coalitions expand. Since the liability
game is constant sum, it then follows that the excesses of the complementary coalitions
are weakly decreasing. For coalitions containing the firm with total claims above the asset
value, the situation is reversed. The excesses at the nucleolus are weakly decreasing as the
coalitions expand and the excesses of the complementary coalitions are weakly increasing.
The result of Theorem 5.1 can be used to show that the coalition of all creditors C has
the highest excess at the nucleolus.
Theorem 5.2. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
For every S ∈ N it holds that e(S,Nu(v)) ≤ e(C,Nu(v)).
Proof. In case ˆ`(C) ≤ A, all excesses are equal to zero by Theorem 4.6, so the result
follows. For the remainder of the proof, we assume ˆ`(C) > A.
Let x = Nu(v). It holds that
e(C, x) = v(C)− x(C) = A− (x(N)− x0) = x0 ≥ v({0}) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from Theorem 4.8.
We show first that, for every U ∈ N such that U ⊂ C, e(U, x) ≤ e(C, x). Let V = C \U.
If ˆ`(V ) ≤ A, then by taking S = ∅ and T = V in Part 2 of Theorem 5.1, we have that
e(C, x) ≥ e(C \ V, x) = e(U, x).
Consider next the case ˆ`(V ) > A. Take any i ∈ U. By setting S = V and T = C \ {i} ⊇ V
in Part 4 of Theorem 5.1, we get that
e(U, x) = e(C \ V, x) ≤ e(C \ (C \ {i}), x) = e({i}, x) = v({i})− xi ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from Theorem 4.8. Since e(C, x) ≥ 0, it also holds that
e(U, x) ≤ e(C, x) in this case.
Let T ∈ N be a coalition with the maximal excess at x. Suppose e(C, x) < e(T, x). We
have that 0 ∈ T by the first part of the proof. Let ε ∈ (0, e(T, x) − e(C, x)) and define
y ∈ I∗(v) by
y0 = x0 + ε,
yi = xi − εc , i ∈ C.
Let some S ∈ N be given. If S ⊆ C, then
e(S, y) = e(S, x) + ε |S|
c
≤ e(C, x) + ε < e(T, x).
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If 0 ∈ S, then
e(S, y) = e(S, x) + ε |S|−1
c
− ε < e(S, x).
It follows that
max
S∈N
e(S, y) < max
S∈N
e(S, x) = e(T, x),
so θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)), contradicting that x is equal to the pre-nucleolus. 2
The coalition of all creditors has the maximal excess at the nucleolus. The maximal
excess is a non-negative amount.
Next, we show that the firm gets an amount strictly exceeding its stand-alone value if
and only if the sum of the truncated liabilities strictly exceeds its asset value.
Theorem 5.3. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability game.
It holds that Nu0(v) > v({0}) if and only if ˆ`(C) > A.
Proof.
(⇐) Let x = Nu(v). It holds that `(C) > A, so v({0}) = 0 by Theorem 2.3. By
Theorem 4.3, Core(v) = ∅, so there is a coalition with a strictly positive excess at the
nucleolus, and by Theorem 5.2 it holds that e(C, x) > 0. The result follows by observing
that e(C, x) = v(C)− x(C) = A− (A− x0) = x0.
(⇒)
Suppose ˆ`(C) ≤ A. Then the game v is additive by Theorem 3.2, so Nu0(v) = v({0}),
leading to a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that ˆ`(C) > A. 2
When the nucleolus is used as a liability rule, then the firm gets a strictly higher amount
than its stand-alone value if and only if the firm is insolvent and has multiple positive
liabilities. To put it differently, the firm needs the threat to pay others in order to keep
some of its asset value in case of an insolvency. In this case the core of the liability game is
empty by Theorem 4.3 and the game is not additive by Theorem 3.2. As a consequence, the
firm receives strong debt forgiveness if and only if it is insolvent and has multiple positive
liabilities.
We now provide an upper bound on the payment an insolvent firm with multiple positive
liabilities receives at the nucleolus. The next theorem shows that it can get at most half
of the asset value.
Theorem 5.4. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem such that ˆ`(C) ≥ A and let v be the
induced liability game. It holds that Nu0(v) ≤ A/2.
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Proof. Let x = Nu(v). Suppose x0 > A/2. Let ε ∈ (0, x0 − A/2) and define y ∈ I(v)
by
y0 = x0 − ε,
yi = xi +
ε
c
, i ∈ C.
Let some S ∈ N be given. If S ⊆ C, then
e(S, y) = e(S, x)− ε |S|
c
< e(C, x),
where the inequality follows from Theorem 5.2.
If 0 ∈ S, then e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S) < A− A/2 = A/2 and
e(S, y) = e(S, x)− ε |S|−1
c
+ ε ≤ e(S, x) + ε ≤ A/2 + ε < x0 = e(C, x).
It follows that
max
S∈N
e(S, y) < e(C, x) = max
S∈N
e(S, x),
so θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)), contradicting that x is equal to the nucleolus. 2
We show in Section 6 that the firm can get arbitrarily close to A/2 when the nucleolus
is used as a liability rule, so the upper bound as provided in Theorem 5.4 is tight.
An interesting question is whether every creditor with a positive claim faces a loss in
case the firm is insolvent, so whether there is positive debt forgiveness by each creditor
with a positive claim on the firm. The following example shows this is not always the case.
Example 5.5. Consider the liability problem (`, A) ∈ L with 3 creditors, where A = 10,
`1 = 1, and `2 = `3 = 8. Notice that the firm is insolvent. The induced liability game v is
depicted in Table 7.
It is easily verified that the nucleolus of the liability game v is equal to Nu(v) = x =
(7/3, 1, 10/3, 10/3), at which x1 = `1 = 1. There is no debt forgiveness by creditor 1,
even though the insolvent firm receives strong debt forgiveness and ends up with a strictly
positive amount of x0 = 7/3. There is positive debt forgiveness by creditors 2 and 3,
d2(A, `, x) = d3(A, `, x) = 14/3.
The feature in Example 5.5, an insolvent firm paying some of its liabilities in full, can
only occur for some of its smaller liabilities. Our last result in this section shows that there
is higher debt forgiveness by creditors with higher claims at the nucleolus. We also show
that creditors with higher claims receive higher payments at the nucleolus.
Theorem 5.6. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem and let v the induced liability game.
Let i, j ∈ C be such that `i ≤ `j. At x = Nu(v) it holds that xi ≤ xj and `i − xi ≤ `j − xj.
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S {0} {1} {2} {3} {0, 1} {0, 2} {0, 3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 1 1 1 8 8 2 2 9
x(S) 7
3
1 10
3
10
3
10
3
17
3
17
3
13
3
13
3
20
3
e(S, x) −7
3
−1 −7
3
−7
3
−7
3
7
3
7
3
−7
3
−7
3
7
3
S {0, 1, 2} {0, 1, 3} {0, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 9 9 10 10
x(S) 20
3
20
3
9 23
3
e(S, x) 7
3
7
3
1 7
3
Table 7: The induced liability game when N = {0, 1, 2, 3}, A = 10, `1 = 1, and `2 = `3 = 8,
and the excesses at the nucleolus x = (7/3, 1, 10/3, 10/3).
Proof. Suppose xi > xj. We define y ∈ I(v) by yi = xi − ε and yj = xj + ε, where ε is
chosen sufficient small such that yi > yj. The other components of y are set equal to the
corresponding components of x. For coalitions S ∈ N such that both i and j belong to S
or both i and j belong to C \ S, it clearly holds that e(S, x) = e(S, y).
Take some S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. We demonstrate that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, x), e(S ∪ {j}, x)} > max{e(S ∪ {i}, y), e(S ∪ {j}, y)}.
It holds that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, x), e(S ∪ {i}, x)} = max{v(S ∪ {i})− x(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})− x(S ∪ {j})}
= v(S ∪ {j})− x(S ∪ {j})},
where the last equality follows from v(S ∪ {i}) ≤ v(S ∪ {j}) and xi > xj.
It holds that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, y), e(S ∪ {i}, y)} = max{v(S ∪ {i})− y(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})− y(S ∪ {j})}
= v(S ∪ {j})− y(S ∪ {j})},
= v(S ∪ {j})− x(S ∪ {j})− ε},
where the second equality follows from v(S ∪ {i}) ≤ v(S ∪ {j}) and yi > yj.
It follows that θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)), contradicting that x is equal to the nucleolus.
Consequently, it holds that xi ≤ xj.
Suppose `i − xi > `j − xj. We define y ∈ I(v) by yi = xi + ε and yj = xj − ε, where
ε is chosen sufficient small such that `i − yi > `j − yj. The other components of y are set
equal to the corresponding components of x. For coalitions S ∈ N such that both i and j
belong to S or both i and j belong to C \ S, it clearly holds that e(S, x) = e(S, y).
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Take some S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. We demonstrate that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, x), e(S ∪ {j}, x)} > max{e(S ∪ {i}, y), e(S ∪ {j}, y)}.
It holds that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, x), e(S ∪ {i}, x)} = max{v(S ∪ {i})− x(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})− x(S ∪ {j})}
= v(S ∪ {i})− x(S ∪ {i})},
where the last equality follows from v(S ∪{i})− v(S ∪{j}) ≥ `i− `j and `i− xi > `j − xj.
It holds that
max{e(S ∪ {i}, y), e(S ∪ {i}, y)} = max{v(S ∪ {i})− y(S ∪ {i}), v(S ∪ {j})− y(S ∪ {j})}
= v(S ∪ {i})− y(S ∪ {i})},
= v(S ∪ {i})− x(S ∪ {i})− ε},
where the second equality follows from v(S∪{i})−v(S∪{j}) ≥ `i−`j and `i−yi > `j−yj.
It follows that θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)), contradicting that x is equal to the nucleolus.
Consequently, it holds that `i − xi ≤ `j − xj. 2
Theorem 5.6 implies using the nucleolus as a liability rule leads to the same payment to
creditors with identical claims. In terms of debt forgiveness, we have seen in Example 5.5
that there is no debt forgiveness by creditors with low claims even when the firm is insolvent.
Theorem 5.6 generalizes this insight and implies that there is a threshold such that there
is no debt forgiveness by creditors with claims below the threshold and positive debt
forgiveness by creditors with claims above the threshold.
6 The Generalized Proportional Rule
In principe, it is possible to compute the nucleolus by solving a linear programming prob-
lem. However, the size of the linear programming problem is related to the number of
coalitions, which increases exponentially in the number of players. For instance, in a game
with n players, Owen (1974) presents a linear programming formulation to compute the
nucleolus that involves 2n+1 + n variables and 4n + 1 constraints. In this section, we ar-
gue that for liability problems there is a relation between the nucleolus and the so-called
generalized truncated proportional rule and we have a closed from solution for the latter.
A well-known liability rule in bankruptcy situations is the proportional rule. Under
the proportional rule, in case of an insolvency, the entire asset value is distributed to the
creditors in proportion to their liabilities. The insolvent agent is then left without any
assets. We define the generalized proportional rule by making payments in proportion
to the liabilities, but by allowing for a non-negative payment to the firm even in case of
insolvency.
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Definition 6.1. The liability rule p : L → RN+ is a generalized proportional rule if for every
(A, `) ∈ L there is λ ∈ R+ such that for every i ∈ C it holds that pi(A, `) = λ`i.
Recall that by definition of a liability rule it holds that 0 ≤ p0(A, `), for every i ∈ C,
0 ≤ pi(A, `) ≤ `i, and
∑
i∈N pi(A, `) = A. Given the amount p0(A, `) the firm is allowed to
keep for itself, the payments to the creditors are uniquely determined under the generalized
proportional rule.
The truncated proportional rule distributes the entire asset value in proportion to the
truncated liabilities. The generalized truncated proportional rule does the same, but allows
the insolvent agent to keep some of its asset value.
Definition 6.2. The liability rule pˆ : L → RN+ is a generalized truncated proportional rule
if for every (A, `) ∈ L there is λ ∈ R+ such that for every i ∈ C it holds that pi(A, `) = λˆ`i.
Again, once the amount pˆ0(A, `) ∈ [0, A] the firm is allowed to keep has been decided
upon, the payments to the creditors are uniquely determined under the generalized trun-
cated proportional rule. Let pˆ∗ : L → RN+ denote the generalized truncated proportional
rule obtained when
pˆ∗0(A, `) =
{
A− ˆ`(C), if ˆ`(C) ≤ A,
(ˆ`(C)−A)A
2ˆ`(C)−A , if
ˆ`(C) > A.
It is easily verified that pˆ∗0(A, `) ∈ [0, A].
We first study liability problems with ˆ`(C) ≤ A, so the firm is either solvent or has a
single positive liability. The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.6.
Corollary 6.3. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem such that ˆ`(C) ≤ A and let v be the
induced liability game. It holds that Nu(v) = pˆ∗(A, `).
We next turn to the case of an insolvent firm with multiple positive liabilities.
For a given liability problem (A, `) ∈ L, let C˜ be the set of creditors with a liability
strictly in between 0 and A, so C˜ = {i ∈ C | 0 < `i < A}, and denote the cardinality of
C˜ by c˜. For each non-empty S ⊆ C˜, let m˜(S) ∈ RC˜ denote the membership vector of S,
so m˜i(S) = 1 if i ∈ S and m˜i(S) = 0 if i ∈ C˜ \ S. Let S˜ be a collection of non-empty
coalitions of creditors in C˜, so for every S ∈ S˜ it holds that ∅ 6= S ⊆ C˜. The collection S˜ is
independent if {m˜(S)|S ∈ S˜} is a set of independent vectors. The collection S˜ is balanced
if there are weights (λS)S∈S˜ ∈ RS˜++ such that
∑
S∈S˜ λSm˜(S) = m˜(C˜).
Assumption 6.4. The liability problem (A, `) ∈ L is such that ˆ`(C) > A and there exists
an independent and balanced collection of coalitions S˜ with |S˜| = c˜ such that for every
S ∈ S˜ we have that `(S) = A.
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As an illustration, the following example presents a number of cases where Assump-
tion 6.4 is satisfied.
Example 6.5.
Case 1. The liability problem (A, `) ∈ L is such that ˆ`(C) > A and for every i ∈ C, `i = 0
or `i ≥ A. It holds that C˜ = ∅ and Assumption 6.4 is trivially satisfied.
Case 2. The liability problem (A, `) ∈ L has exactly three creditors with a claim in
(0, A), without loss of generality, C˜ = {1, 2, 3}, and (`1, `2, `3) = (12A, 12A, 12A). Then
Assumption 6.4 is satisfied with S˜ = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} and λS = 1/2 for all S ∈ S˜.
Case 3. The liability problem (A, `) ∈ L has exactly four creditors with a claim in
(0, A), without loss of generality, C˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and (`1, `2, `3, `4) = (13A, 13A, 13A, 23A).
Then Assumption 6.4 is satisfied with S˜ = {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}} and λ{1,4} =
λ{2,4} = λ{3,4} = 1/3 and λ{1,2,3} = 2/3.
The next result shows that under Assumption 6.4, the nucleolus corresponds to the
payment generated by the generalized truncated proportional rule pˆ∗.
Theorem 6.6. Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem satisfying Assumption 6.4 and let v be
the induced liability game. It holds that Nu(v) = pˆ∗(A, `), so
Nu0(v) =
(ˆ`(C)−A)A
2ˆ`(C)−A ,
Nui(v) =
A
2ˆ`(C)−A
ˆ`
i, for all i ∈ C.
Proof. Let x = pˆ∗(A, `). We show that x is the nucleolus of v.
We show first that the excesses of all coalitions are less than or equal to x0.
Let some S ∈ N be given. We distinguish the cases 0 ∈ S and 0 /∈ S.
Case 1. 0 ∈ S.
We have that
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S)
= min{A, `(S \ {0})} − x0 − A2ˆ`(C)−A ˆ`(S \ {0})
= min{A, ˆ`(S \ {0})} − x0 − A2ˆ`(C)−A ˆ`(S \ {0})
= (1− A
2ˆ`(C)−A) min{A, ˆ`(S \ {0})} − x0
≤ (1− A
2ˆ`(C)−A)A− x0
= x0,
where the second equality follows from Theorem 2.3.
Case 2. 0 /∈ S.
By Theorem 2.3 it holds that
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S) = max{0, A− `(C \ S)} − (A− x0 − x(C \ S)).
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If A− `(C \ S) ≥ 0, then the right-hand side of the equation above equals
A− `(C \ S)− A+ x0 + x(C \ S) ≤ x0.
Otherwise, A− `(C \ S) < 0 and the right-hand side is equal to
−A+ x0 + x(C \ S) ≤ x0.
Let S˜ be an independent and balanced collection of coalitions with |S˜| = c˜ such that for
all S ∈ S˜ we have that `(S) = A and let (λS)S∈S˜ ∈ RS˜+ be the corresponding vector of
balancing weights. We define C = {i ∈ C | `i > 0} as the set of creditors with a positive
claim and denote its cardinality by c. We define S = S˜ ∪ {{i} | i ∈ C \ C˜} as the collection
of coalitions in S˜ together with the singletons whose members have a claim greater than or
equal to A. For a non-empty subset S of C, we define the membership vector m(S) ∈ RC
by mi(S) = 1 if i ∈ S and mi(S) = 0 if i ∈ C \ S. We denote m(C) by 1 .
Since the set {m˜(S) | S ∈ S˜} is a set of independent vectors of cardinality c˜ and
{m({i}) | i ∈ C \ C˜} is a set of unit vectors with coordinate one at a player not being part
of some S ∈ S˜, the set {m(S) | S ∈ S} is a set of independent vectors of cardinality c. For
i ∈ C \ C, we define λ{i} = 1. We have that∑
S∈S
λSm(S) = 1 ,
or in matrix notation, with M being the matrix with columns equal to m(S) for S ∈ S,
Mλ = 1 .
It holds that∑
S∈S
λS > 1, (6.1)
since by Assumption 6.4 ˆ`(C) > A, so c ≥ 2, and the set S therefore contains at least two
coalitions, whereas the sum of the weights over the members of each coalition is equal to
1.
Let some S ∈ S be given. We have by Theorem 2.3 that v({0}∪S) = min{A, `(S)} = A,
where the last equality follows from Assumption 6.4 if S ∈ S˜ and from `i ≥ A if S = {i}
for i ∈ C \ C˜. It follows that
e({0} ∪ S, x) = v({0} ∪ S)− x({0} ∪ S)
= A− x0 − A2ˆ`(C)−A ˆ`(S)
= A− (ˆ`(C)−A)A
2ˆ`(C)−A − A2ˆ`(C)−AA
= (
ˆ`(C)−A)A
2ˆ`(C)−A = x0.
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For the coalition of all creditors, we have that
e(C, x) = v(C)− x(C) = A− (A− x0) = x0
as well.
Let y = Nu(v) and suppose y 6= x. We have that θ(e(y)) ≺lex θ(e(x)). From
e(C, y) = v(C)− y(C) = A− A+ y0 = y0,
it follows that y0 ≤ x0.
For every S ∈ S it holds that
e({0} ∪ S, y) = v({0} ∪ S)− y({0} ∪ S) = A− y({0} ∪ S)
≤ x0 = e({0} ∪ S, x) = A− x({0} ∪ S).
It follows that, for every S ∈ S, x0 + x(S) ≤ y0 + y(S), or in matrix notation
x01 +M
>xC ≤ yC1 +M>yC . (6.2)
Consider first the case x0 = y0. Since x 6= y and M has full rank, we have that
M>xC < M
>yC .
Taking the inner product with the vector of balancing weights λ, we obtain
1>xC = λ
>M>xC < λ
>M>yC = 1
>yC . (6.3)
For every i ∈ C such that `i = 0, it holds that xi = yi = 0 since x and y are payment
vectors. Also, x0 = y0 and x(N) = y(N), so we find that 1
>xC = 1
>yC , leading to a
contradiction with (6.3).
Consider next the case y0 < x0. We take the inner product of (6.2) with the vector of
balancing weights λ. Since
λ>M>xC = 1
>xC = 1
>xC = A− x0,
λ>M>yC = 1
>yC = 1
>yC = A− y0,
we get
x0λ
>1 + A− x0 ≤ y0λ>1 + A− y0,
which is equivalent to
(x0 − y0)(λ>1 − 1) ≤ 0.
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Since x0 > y0 and λ
>1 =
∑
S∈S λS > 1 by (6.1), we obtain a contradiction. Consequently,
it holds that x = y as was to be shown. 2
The intuition behind Theorem 6.6 is as follows. By Theorem 5.2, the coalition of all
creditors C has the highest excess among all coalitions at the nucleolus. By Theorem 5.1, a
coalition S such that ˆ`(S) = A is such that at the nucleolus the excess of coalition {0}∪S
is greater than or equal to the excess of coalition {0} ∪ T if S contains T or T contains S.
Assumption 6.4 ensures that we can find c˜ coalitions S that are balanced and independent
such that `(S) = ˆ`(S) = A. Together with singleton coalitions consisting of i ∈ C such that
`i ≥ A, this leads to c coalitions S that are balanced and independent such that ˆ`(S) = A,
where c is the number of positive liabilities. The system of equations that results from
equating the excess of all these coalitions with the excess of coalition C and specifying
payments of zero for liabilities equal to zero has full rank and therefore a unique solution.
The solution is then shown to be the nucleolus.
Let (A, `) ∈ L be a liability problem such that `i ≥ A for every i ∈ C. Case 1 in
Example 6.5 is satisfied, so the nucleolus Nu(v) of the induced liability game is equal to
pˆ∗(A, `). We have that
pˆ∗0(A, `) =
(ˆ`(C)− A)A
2ˆ`(C)− A =
(cA− A)A
2cA− A =
(c− 1)A
2c− 1 .
Theorem 5.4 states that the payment received by an insolvent firm is at most equal to half
of the asset value. The expression above shows that debt forgiveness can get arbitrarily
close to A/2 for large values of c.
Assumption 6.4 is not satisfied in Example 2.4. According to the generalized truncated
proportional rule pˆ∗, the payoff vector should be (2, 4, 6), whereas the nucleolus assigns
(1, 4, 7). The reason is that there are no coalitions S in Example 2.4 such that `(S) = A.
However, in many examples it is possible to find a collection of coalitions that is balanced
and independent such that `(S) is approximately equal to A for every coalition S in the
collection. The generalized truncated proportional rule pˆ∗ is therefore approximately equal
to the nucleolus in many examples. Our last example demonstrates this point for the case
where the firm is insolvent and all liabilities are the same.
Example 6.7. Consider a liability problem (`, A) ∈ L where all liabilities are identical
and equal to a < A. We assume the firm is insolvent, so ca > A. Let k ∈ N be such that
ka ≤ A and (k + 1)a > A. If S ⊂ C is a coalition with k creditors, then v({0} ∪ S) = ka
and if T ⊆ C is a coalition with k + 1 creditors than v({0} ∪ T ) = A. We denote the
nucleolus Nu(v) of the liability game v by x. Since all liabilities are identical, all creditors
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receive the same payoff, x1. We have that
e({0} ∪ S, x) = ka− x0 − kx1,
e({0} ∪ T, x) = A− x0 − (k + 1)x1.
It holds that v(C) = A and e(C, x) = x0. It holds that ka− x0− kx1 ≥ A− x0− (k+ 1)x1
if and only if x1 ≥ A− ka.
We solve for
ka− x0 − kx1 = x0,
x0 + cx1 = A,
and find
x0 =
cka−kA
2c−k ,
x1 =
2A−ka
2c−k .
The condition x1 ≥ A− ka is then equivalent to
ka
2c− k − 1
2c− k − 2 ≥ A.
This condition is clearly satisfied whenever ka = A. In that case, we get exactly the
payment vector of the generalized truncated proportional rule pˆ∗(A, `) of Theorem 6.6, so
x0 =
(c−k)A
2c−k ,
x1 =
A
2c−k .
To the extent that ka is almost equal to A, we get that the nucleolus is almost equal to
the generalized truncated proportional rule pˆ∗(A, `).
In case ka(2c− k − 1) < A(2c− k − 2), we find the nucleolus by solving
A− x0 − (k + 1)x1 = x0,
x0 + cx1 = A,
and find
x0 =
cA−(k+1)A
2c−k−1 ,
x1 =
A
2c−k−1 .
Again, to the extent that (k+ 1)a is almost equal to A, we get that the nucleolus is almost
equal to the payment vector of the generalized truncated proportional rule pˆ∗(A, `).
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7 Conclusion
A liability problem consists of a firm with a certain asset value having liabilities towards a
group of creditors. We study the allocation of the asset value of the firm among the creditors
using transferable utility games and, contrary to the large body of game-theoretic work
on bankruptcy games, treat the firm as a player. A major advantage of using transferable
utility games is that we can avoid the specification of the fine details of the negotiation
process.
We show that the core of the game is non-empty if and only if the firm is insolvent
and has multiple positive liabilities. This means that in most situations with insolvency,
irrespective of the allocation of the asset value of the firm to the creditors, there is always
some coalition that has a complaint. We are therefore interested in payment vectors that
are generated by the nucleolus of liability game as these are payment vectors that minimize
the complaints coalitions can have. We show that the nucleolus assigns a payoff to the firm
above the firm’s stand-alone value if and only if it is insolvent and has multiple positive
liabilities. In these cases, the firm is allowed to keep part of its asset value, and there is,
therefore, debt forgiveness by some of its creditors. The reason for debt forgiveness is that
the firm in a liability game has the “threat to pay others.”
We show that an insolvent firm ends up with at most one half of its asset value and
that this upper bound is tight. We also show that creditors with higher claims get higher
payments, but they also have higher debt forgiveness. It follows that there is a threshold
on the size of the liabilities such that below the threshold there is no debt forgiveness and
above the threshold there is positive debt forgiveness. In many cases, this threshold is
equal to zero, but we show that there are examples where the threshold is positive.
In general, there is no closed-form solution for the liability rule that is generated by
the nucleolus. However, we provide conditions under which it coincides with a generalized
truncated proportional rule. We have a closed-form solution for the amount of the asset
value that the firm is allowed to keep. The remainder of the asset value is allocated to the
creditors in proportion to their claim on the firm, where that claim is truncated by the
firm’s asset value.
In the game-theoretic literature on bankruptcy games, the bankrupt agent is not treated
as a player, but rather as an exogenous estate. As shown by Aumann and Maschler (1985),
the nucleolus corresponds to the constrained equal awards rule if the value of the estate is
below the sum of the half-claims and the constrained equal losses rule if it is above. It is
striking that the case where the bankrupt agent is a player makes such a big difference in
the allocation of the asset value.
We believe there to be quite some potential for future research on liability games. One
question is whether the generalized truncated proportional rule we find can be axiomatized.
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One may also study the properties of solutions different from the nucleolus. We have taken
the theory of transferable utility games to bypass the exact modeling of the negotiation
process. It would also be interesting to study the equilibria of non-cooperative bargaining
models. The model can be generalized and extended in many different ways. One possible
extension is to go from a single bankrupt agent with creditors to the case where the
creditors are agents themselves and may also have solvency issues. The model then becomes
an extension of the seminal model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) to study bankruptcy in
financial networks.
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